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The aim of this paper is to elucidate Keynes's Marshallian lineage. I argue that the result of 
bringing out the Marshallian antecedents of the General Theory highlights Keynes’s failure to 
achieve  the  theoretical  project  he  was  striving  at,  namely  to  demonstrate  an  involuntary 
unemployment result in the arising of which nominal wage rigidity would play no role.  
In the first part of the paper, I reexamine Marshall’s theory of value. This section’s main 
conclusion is that no theory of unemployment is to be found in Marshall’s writings. In section 
two, I study the literature spanning from Marshall to Keynes, focusing on Beveridge, Hicks 
and Pigou, in order to see whether the lacuna present in Marshall’s writings happened to be 
filled. Documenting the emergence of the notion of frictional unemployment, I come to the 
conclusion that its arising went along with little theoretical elaboration. The third and last part 
of the paper is a critical reflection on the General Theory. I start by making the point that 
Keynes’s  theory  of  effective  demand  ought  to  be  viewed  as  an  extension  of  Marshall’s 
analysis of firms’ short-period production decisions. This enables me to bring out the decisive 
role played by the wage rigidity assumption in Keynes’s reasoning. I claim that, except for 
this assumption, the differences between ‘effective demand à la Marshall’ and  ‘effective 
demand à la Keynes’ are minor. I close my analysis of Keynes’s reasoning by showing that 
no real removal of the nominal rigidity assumption is to be found in chapter 19 of the General 
Theory.  
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Many  authors  (e.g.  Clower,1975;  Leijonhufvud,  2006;  Hayes,  2006;  Lawlor,  2006)  have 
defended the view that a correct understanding of Keynes’s General Theory (1936) requires a 
central place to be given to his Marshallian lineage. While agreeing with these authors, I 
differ from them as far as the implications of their views are concerned. It is true that reading 
the General Theory in this way is enlightening. However, it does not follow that Keynes’s 
theory is thereby reinforced, as several of these authors seem to take for granted. On the 
contrary, I shall argue that such a reading points to Keynes’s failure to achieve the theoretical 
project he was striving for, namely to demonstrate an involuntary unemployment result in the 
origins of which nominal wage rigidity would play no role.  
In the first part of this paper, I re-examine Marshall’s theory of value.1 Three specific points 
are dealt with: Marshall’s account of the working of the market day (the corn model); his 
conceptualization of time; and his analysis of firms’ optimizing production decision in the 
short term. This section’s main conclusion is that no theory of unemployment is to be found 
in Marshall’s writings. In section two, I study the literature of the period between Marshall 
and Keynes in order to see whether the lacuna in Marshall’s writings was filled in this period. 
Documenting  the  emergence  of  the  notion  of  frictional  unemployment,  I  come  to  the 
conclusion that its elaboration was not accompanied by much theoretical elaboration. This 
means that when Keynes started to write the General Theory, unemployment theory was 
almost non-existent. The third and last part of the paper is a critical reflection on the General 
Theory. Its aim is to assess the implications of anchoring Keynes’s theory more firmly in the 
Marshallian tradition. I start by developing the point (already made by Clower) that Keynes’s 
theory of effective demand ought to be viewed as an extension of Marshall’s analysis of 
firms’ short-period production decisions. This enables me to bring out the decisive role played 
by the wage rigidity assumption in Keynes’s reasoning. I shall claim that, except for this 
assumption, the differences between ‘effective demand à la Marshall’ and ‘effective demand 
à la Keynes’ are minor. I close my analysis of Keynes’s reasoning by showing that, contrary 
to what is usually claimed, no real removal of the nominal rigidity assumption is to be found 
in Chapter 19 of the General Theory.  
Before  entering  into  these  questions,  a  preliminary  methodological  remark  is  useful. 
Leijonhufvud has recurrently observed (e.g. in Leijonhufvud 2006) that a distinction should 
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be drawn between a theory and a model. To him, a theory is a set of beliefs about reality, 
propositions claiming to tell the truth about some real-world occurrences. In turn, a model is a 
formal representation of these beliefs or a part of them. Usually, it takes a mathematical form 
but reasoning in prose or with the support of graphs is also possible. Here the aim is to draw 
logical  inferences,  to  defend  the  validity  of  the  reality-geared  proposition  through  a 
demonstrative  procedure.  My  aim  in  this  paper  is  to  assess  unemployment  as  present  in 
Marshall’s and Keynes’s models even if, following the usual practice, I often use the term 
‘theory’ (e. g. Keynes’s theory of effective demand) when in all rigor I should say ‘model’. 
 
MARSHALL 2 
Marshall’s time framework 
Marshall  was  keenly  aware  that  “man’s  powers  are  limited”  while  “almost  every  one  of 
nature’s riddles is complex”. “Breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, and 
at last combining his partial solutions with a supreme effort of his whole small strength into 
some sort of an attempt at a solution of the whole riddle” was his strategy (Marshall 1920: 
366).  This  partitioning process,  he  claimed,  should  proceed  along  two  lines,  dividing  the 
economy into separate industries, on the one hand, and dividing time into three categories ― 
the market (the unit period of exchange), the short period and the long period — on the other. 
This led Marshall to  separate three equilibrium concepts associated with these three time 
categories. Each of them could be the subject of a separate analysis: market-day equilibrium 
(in  short,  market  equilibrium),  short-run  equilibrium  and  long-run  equilibrium.  Marshall 
engaged  in  these  separate  analyses  but,  as  is  well  known,  his  theory  evolved  on  robust 
grounds  only  for  the  short-run  equilibrium  aspect.  He  also  argued  that  the  relationship 
between these categories should be viewed as a gravitational process.  
The lack of any rationing (and hence unemployment) result in Marshall’s theory of value 
Marshall’s main interest when constructing his theory of value lay in what he called the study 
of normal equilibrium, the centre of gravitation for market outcomes. Nonetheless he must be 
credited  for  having  addressed  the  issue  of  market-day  equilibrium,  the  outcome  of  the 
working of markets on a daily basis, in Chapter II of Book V of the Principles. Let me retrace 
Marshall’s reasoning in this chapter. 
From the outset, the reader is provided with information about the market supply and demand 
schedules enabling him to calculate what Marshall calls the ‘true equilibrium’ — 700 hundred 
                                                 
2 Here I draw on De Vroey (2007).  
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quarters traded at the unit price of 36 shillings.3 Marshall suggests that this is the result of a 
bargaining process between agents, the “haggling and bargaining of the price around the 36 
shillings mark”. Eventually, he claims, the price of 36 shillings will impose itself. What is the 
underlying mechanism? Scrap the rhetorical effects, and it turns out that the attainment of 
market equilibrium results from agents’ ability to form correct conjectures about equilibrium 
values or, in other words, from their being as knowledgeable about market conditions as the 
outside economist. In short, it must be assumed that agents hold perfect information. Under 
this assumption, all sellers will be ready to trade at a price above the equilibrium price, but 
they will never find trading partners from the other side of the market; the converse is true for 
purchasers. As a result, trade will occur at the equilibrium price only.  
However, Marshall is aware that this assumption is too heroic. Hence his next move is to 
show  that  the  same  result  comes  close  to  being  realized  when  the  assumption  of  perfect 
information is removed or, more precisely, limited to one side of the market. To this end, it is 
necessary to assume that the marginal utility of money is constant, which, in turn, requires 
expenditure made in the market under study to represent only a small proportion of total 
income.  Now  market  equilibrium  is  attained  gradually  through  successive  false  trading 
without income effects being generated. The end result is almost the same as in the perfect 
information case. The quantity of corn traded and the price of corn in the last transaction are 
the same as in true equilibrium, but agents end up with different money balances.  
Although a testimony to Marshall’s cleverness, this last step of his reasoning cannot win the 
day because the idea of a constant marginal utility of money (or income) is ad hoc, and cannot 
be  generalized.  Actually,  Marshall  fails  to  refer  to  it  later  on,  and  falls  back,  be  it  only 
implicitly,  on  the  perfect  information  assumption.  An  important  conclusion  follows:  the 
Marshallian market always features a match between market supply and demand, i.e. market 
clearing.  
Three implications ought to be drawn. First, whenever the perfect information assumption is 
adopted, the idea that duration matters ceases to be relevant. On any market day, equilibrium 
can be arrived at quickly or slowly, yet this hardly matters. Applying Occam’s razor, we can 
consider the formation of market equilibrium to occur in logical time, i.e. instantaneously. In 
other words, once the perfect information assumption predominates, the idea that equilibrium 
follows from negotiations between sellers and purchasers turns out to be just a rhetorical 
varnish.  
Second, I must raise the question of whether Marshall’s account of the corn market can be 
extended to the labor market. My answer is ‘yes’. At the end of his chapter on the corn market 
                                                 
3  This  shows  that  Marshall,  unlike  Walras,  was  not  interested  in  demonstrating  the  logical  existence  of 
equilibrium. Rather, he wanted to elucidate how agents’ interactions could end up making these equilibrium 
values effective.  
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model,  Marshall  admits  that  the  constant  marginal  utility  of  money  assumption  is 
inappropriate  when  it  comes  to  the  labor  market.  Moreover,  his  scattered  remarks  in  the 
Principles about labor pertain to the particularities of the demand for, and supply of, labor 
rather than to the functioning of the labor market. He never argues that the labor market 
functions differently from the corn market. The bottom line must be that, to Marshall, the 
labor market operated on the same principles as the corn market, in which case it would not 
be an exception to the market clearing principle. In other words, there is no room for the 
notion of unemployment in Marshall’s value theory. There is one exception, but it is trivial 
(and not even considered by Marshall). It follows from assuming an exogenous wage floor. If 
this is above the market-clearing level, unemployment rises. Not that Marshall remained silent 
on the topic of unemployment. It is just that he had limited interest in it. As Matthews noted:  
 The social problem that disturbed his conscience was poverty; and poverty might 
have a number of causes, of which unemployment was only one (Matthews 1990: 
33). 
 Cyclical  unemployment  was  par  excellence  a  ‘Vol.  II’  subject,  along  with 
business cycles generally. It does get some treatment in the Principles, but to a 
large  extent  Marshall’s  views  have  to  be  pieced  together  from  his  various 
writings. Those are often fragmentary or aphoristic (Matthews 1990: 35).4  
My third remark is that the permanent realization of market clearing in Marshall’s analysis 
does not preclude it having some room for frictions. It is just that these frictions should not be 
viewed as causes of market non-clearing. Since this point has been an important source of 
confusion, it is worth delving into it.  
In Marshallian theory, the study of market equilibrium cannot be separated from the more 
fundamental equilibrium concept, which Marshall calls ‘normal equilibrium’, towards which 
market equilibrium outcomes are assumed to gravitate.5 States of divergence between the 
market equilibrium price and the normal equilibrium price can be considered to be states of 
disequilibrium.  This  means  that  Marshall’s  theory  features  the  possibility  of  co-existence 
between market clearing and disequilibrium, a trait that makes little sense with respect to the 
Walrasian approach.  
To look more closely at this point, about which confusion exist, I will use Marshall’s well-
known fishing industry example (1920, p. 307). In this passage he studied the reaction of 
suppliers to changes in the demand for fish. I will confine my attention to the effect of an 
                                                 
4 In his 2006 book, which devotes a chapter to “The treatment of labor markets in Marshallian economics”, 
Lawlor praises Marshall for emphasizing “the non-deterministic influence of social institutions a work in labor 
markets” and for his account the actual institutional details of wage practices (2006: 69). But when it comes to 
unemployment, Lawlor is compelled to admit that “Marshall had something of a blind spot” (2006: 61). 
5 At present, normal equilibrium is often (misleadingly) called ‘long-period equilibrium’.  
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increase in demand of moderate duration. Marshall supposes that the new equilibrium price 
and quantity will quickly be arrived at, without being more precise. In so far as production 
takes place in advance, and as the change in demand is unanticipated, disequilibrium will be 
present at least on the market day when the shock manifests itself. If the change in variable 
capital can be made before the next period of exchange, the new equilibrium will be reached 
in this next period. But the adjustment process can also be longer, because putting variable 
capital to work can be a time-consuming process. In this case, disequilibrium will extend over 
several periods. The scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Disequilibrium with market clearing 
 
 
Starting from a state of equilibrium at t0 (A), a change in normal demand (ND) of a moderate 
length occurs at t1. As to supply, a distinction has to be drawn between market-day supply 
(MS), which is vertical due to fish’s perishable nature, and short-period normal supply (NS) 
expressing firms’ optimal plan when they can change their variable capital. The initial result 
of the change in demand is that at t1 the market equilibrium price rises to p1. At B, the market 
is in disequilibrium, since the short-period normal equilibrium is not attained. Note, however, 
that market clearing prevails. Normal supply and demand do not match but market supply and 
demand do. Assume that it takes two weeks for the new optimal quantity of variable capital to 
deliver the new planned production, so that the market remains in the state of disequilibrium 
at t2. The short-period equilibrium is reached on the third week at point C. When the departure 
from permanent values comes to an end, the market returns to A. This slow adjustment to 
normal equilibrium (accompanied by an instantaneous adjustment to market equilibrium) can 
be considered to be due to frictions. However, it should not be assumed that such frictions are 
a cause of market rationing.   
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Firms’ equilibrium in the short period 
The perfect information assumption also underpins Marshall study of firms’ optimal short-
period production decisions in a given industry (to be found in Book V, Chapter 5 of the 
Principles). This analysis bears on firms’ individual equilibrium, i.e. the determination of 
their optimal trading plans. As is well known, each firm’s optimizing plan is to equalize 
marginal revenue and marginal cost. To get this result, firms must decide about both the 
supply of outputs and the demand for factors. When they establish their supply curves (their 
marginal cost functions) they need to make conjectures about the cost of their inputs, in 
accordance with the possible varying levels of demand. To this end, the firms need to estimate 
the magnitude of a series of variables, which, at the time of their decision-making, are still 
virtual. The wage rate is one of them. That is, the firms need to make conjectures about the 
labor market outcomes. The fact that Marshall’s jumps at once from individual equilibrium 
(optimal  planning)  to  interactive  equilibrium  (the  industry  equilibrium)  means  that  he 
implicitly assumes that these conjectures are correct. If not, he should have entered into an 
analysis of what goes on when they are wrong. In other words, the determination of normal 
equilibrium in a given branch first occurs as a thought-experiment in the minds of firms’ 
managers, which is only later implemented as an objective observable market experiment. 
This implies that firms hold perfect information.6 
The  following  quotations  from  Marshall’s  Principles  can  be  adduced  in  support  of  my 
interpretation. 
We assume that the forces of supply and demand have free play; that there is no 
close combination among dealers on either side, but each acts for himself, and 
there  is  much  free  competition;  that  is  buyers  generally  compete  freely  with 
buyers, and sellers compete freely with sellers. Though everyone acts for himself, 
his knowledge of what others are doing is supposed to be generally sufficient to 
prevent him from taking a lower or paying a higher price than others are doing. 
This is assumed provisionally to be true both of finished goods and of their factors 
of  production,  of  the  hire  of  labor  and  of  the  borrowing  of  capital.  We  have 
already inquired to some extent, and I shall have to inquire further, how far these 
assumptions are in accordance with the actual facts of life. But meanwhile, this is 
the supposition on which I proceed; I assume that there is only one price in the 
market at one and the same time (1920: 341; my emphasis). 
                                                 
6 The underlying reasoning is as follows. Assume that firms incorporate an incorrect nominal wage (i.e. a market 
non-clearing value). Since market supply and demand always match in Marshallian analysis, in the labor market 
as in other markets, a discrepancy would arise between the actual wage (the market-clearing wage) and the wage 
incorporated by the firms. This would result in their engaging in a change of behavior. But then Marshall’s 
reasoning cannot be considered to describe an equilibrium state. For this to be the case, firms’ conjectures about 
the labor market have to be correct.   
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Here Marshall has no qualms about assuming perfect competition and perfect knowledge.7 
The implications of the sentence in italics should be clarified. If agents refuse any price other 
than the single market-day equilibrium, it means that they know the equilibrium price. The 
question to be addressed then becomes, how this may be true. Again, omniscience is the only 
possible answer. 8  
The same stance is taken — though only implicitly — by Frisch in his canonical exposition of 
Marshall’s value theory (Frisch 1950). 
If the price is given and there are for instance three firms in the market, one 
strong, one average, and one weak, I get a situation as indicated in Figure 3 [not 
shown]. The unbroken curves I and II for each firm represent respectively the unit 
cost curves for all factors and for the variable factors. The broken curves are the 
marginal cost curves. The shaded ones are the individual supply schedules. The 
supply  schedule  of  the  market  (not  drawn)  is  derived  in  the  usual  manner  by 
horizontal  addition  of  the  individual  supply  curves  (the  shaded  ones).  …  The 
point of intersection between the supply schedule of the market and the demand 
schedule of the market determines the normal equilibrium price with reference to 
short periods (Frisch 1950: 503-4). 
Frisch states that the price is given. But where does it come from? Certainly, no auctioneer is 
present. The only conceivable answer is that firms have conjectured the price on the basis of 
past information and their expectations of present conditions. Next, the reader’s attention 
should be drawn on the last sentence of the quotation, which states that normal equilibrium is 
achieved.  This  is  not  an  innocuous  statement.  It  asserts  that  firms’  conjectures  about  the 
equilibrium price have been confirmed. But, then, the coincidence between the conjectured 
and the realized normal equilibrium requires that all firms have perfect knowledge of the 
different underlying factors, in particular the market demand and its underpinnings in terms of 
agents’ preferences, the technological characteristics of the other firms, each firm’s share of 
the  market,  and  the  market  supply  function.  There  is  thus  a  twist.  The  beginning  of  the 
passage  is  concerned  with  firms’  optimizing  production  decisions,  taking  the  price  as  a 
parameter, while its last sentence indicates that normal equilibrium is realized. How is the 
shift  from  the  former  to  the  latter  achieved?  The  only  answer  I  can  think  of  is  perfect 
knowledge.  
                                                 
7 Admittedly, he wrote almost the opposite in other passages of the Principles, (e.g. Marshall, 1920: 540-1). 
8 Perfect  information à la  Marshall should not be ascribed to  Marshall exclusively. It is, for example,  also 
present in Jevons’ Theory of Political Economy: “It  is the very essence of trade to have wide and constant 
information.  A  market,  then,  is  theoretically  perfect  only  when  all  traders  have  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
conditions of supply and demand, and the consequent ratio of exchange” ([1871] 1970: 143). The same idea was 
taken up by later Marshallian economists such as Stigler ([1957] 1965: 252) and Knight (1921: 76 ff.). None of 




UNEMPLOYMENT  THEORY  BETWEEN  MARSHALL  AND  KEYNES 
The previous section has shown that there is no value-theoretical study of unemployment in 
Marshall’s  Principles.  In  this  section,  I  examine  whether  post-Marshall  but  pre-Keynes 
economists improved on this state of affairs. As an exhaustive examination of the literature is 
beyond the scope of this study, I shall content myself with surveying a few key works. The 
authors discussed below are Robbins (1926), Dobb (1928), Beveridge (1908), Hicks (1932) 
and Pigou (1933).9  
Robbins and Dobb 
In  1926,  Lionel  Robbins  published  a  ninety-page  book  entitled  Wages:  An  Introductory 
Analysis of the Wage System under Modern Capitalism. As its title makes clear, it made no 
claim to present cutting-edge research; its aim was purely pedagogical. The topics addressed 
were the nature and measurement of wages, wages and the cost of labor, the determination of 
wages, fluctuations in wages, trade unions and wages, and the state and wages. Robbins’s 
discussion is institutional and down-to-earth with no theoretical reference. 
Maurice Dobb’s  essay, Wages, came out in 1928 in the Cambridge Economic Handbook 
series edited by Keynes. Subsequently, it underwent several revisions and reprints. According 
to Lawlor (2006), it can be considered as the expression of the orthodox Cambridge view of 
the time. Lawlor finds this book praiseworthy for its “ wealth of institutional details” (Lawlor 
2006: 63). It provides a detailed description of distinct methods of wage fixing and contracts 
between employers and employees. Dobb also offers a historical account of wage formation 
from classical to marginalist economics, with Marshallian supply and demand analysis being 
viewed as the apex of this evolution.  
For the purposes of my inquiry, the striking common feature of these two pieces lies in what 
they omit, the issue of unemployment. We have here two authors, one of them with a socialist 
inclination, writing on wages at a time where unemployment had becoming a looming social 
problem, who felt no need to address unemployment in their discussions. 
Beveridge 
In his book, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (first edition 1908; third edition 1912), 
Beveridge  criticized  existing  theory  for  having  neglected  to  address  the  issue  of 
unemployment (without explicitly mentioning Marshall in this respect).10 It is noteworthy that 
he takes it for granted that unemployment is frictional unemployment.  
                                                 
9 For a similar discussion of other authors, in particular Clay and Cannan, see Casson (1983). 
10 There is only one reference to Marshall in the whole book.  
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The weakness alike of theory and practice in regard to unemployment in the past 
has been the assumption that this adjustment was already substantially secured; in 
other words that the force of friction might be neglected (Beveridge, 1912: 216).11 
Beveridge emphasizes three specific imperfections of adjustment, the analysis of which is the 
main  object  of  his  book:  changes  in  the  industrial  structure,  fluctuations  of  industrial 
activities, and the need for a reserve of labor. The reserve of labor is mainly for casual work, 
such as dock work. It is present in trades which experience a high volatility of activity, where 
a permanent reserve is needed to meet these fluctuations. “The men forming these reserves are 
constantly passing into and out of employment” (Beveridge, 1912: 13). The common factor 
underlying these different imperfections is the plurality of labor markets. 
Why should it be the normal condition of the labour market to have more sellers 
than buyers, two men to every job and at least as often two jobs for every man? 
The explanation of the paradox is really a very simple one — that there is no one 
labour market but only an infinite number of separate labour markets (Beveridge, 
1912: 70).12 
According to Beveridge, the solution to the problem is as straightforward as its diagnosis: the 
labor market needs to be better organized, that is to become more centralized.13 “There shall 
be known centres or offices or Exchanges, to which employers shall send or go when they 
want workpeople, to which workpeople shall go when they want employment” (Beveridge, 
1912: 198). 
Beveridge’s book is an excellent work, still impressive today. It provides the reader with a 
wealth  of  data  at  a  time  where  statistics  were  scarce.  It  studies  institutional  aspects  in  a 
detailed way. However, it is hardly a theoretical piece. It may well have introduced the notion 
of frictional unemployment but it fails to explain it theoretically.  
Hicks 
Hicks’s book, The Theory of Wages, published in 1932 is a theoretical essay.14 It addresses 
issues such as the equality between wages and the marginal product, or the coexistence of 
                                                 
11  Unlike  Keynes,  who  opposed  the  notions  of  involuntary  unemployment  and  frictional  unemployment, 
Beveridge considered frictional unemployment to be involuntary (Beveridge, 1912: 3). 
12 Excess supply is also deemed to be due to increases in population (Beveridge, 1912: 70). 
13 In the case of dock workers, “The total number of men practically required to do the work without delay (and 
by consequence the number of reserve labourers) is, in fact, increased by every barrier to free movement from 
one wharf to another, and can correspondingly be decreased by everything tending to the organization of the 
whole ten [wharves] into a single labour market” (Beveridge, 1912: 78). 
14 A second edition was published in 1963. In the latter, Hicks admits that 1932, the blackest year of the Great 
Depression, was not a lucky date for the appearance of his book. Operating at a high level of abstraction, it had 
nothing to say about the situation of the time, and this was certainly shocking. Moreover, the book was published 
on the eve of the appearance of Robinson’s book on imperfect competition and Keynes’s General Theory, which 
were to radically change economists’ vision.   
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wage  increases  and  unemployment.  Here,  I  will  focus  on  Hicks’s  explanation  of 
unemployment. Note first that he (and for that matter all the authors surveyed) took it as a fact 
that real-world labor markets are usually not in a state of equilibrium (Hicks, 1932: 42), an 
opinion with which most economists concurred, both at the time and in subsequent decades, 
until Lucas radically questioned it in the 1970s. 
Hicks’s book is a convoluted piece unceasingly weighing the pros and cons of theoretical 
propositions. Its main message is that ‘pure theory’, i.e. Marshallian theory, should not be 
applied too hastily:  
If a labour market could be found which was genuinely in equilibrium, so that 
every employer could go on employing the same men, and every man could go on 
working for the same employer, without either party having any incentive to make 
a change; and if then the employers’ opportunities of profitably employing labour 
were suddenly reduced, or the number of labourers available suddenly increased, 
unemployment  would  result.  If  the  new  conditions  remained  unchanged 
indefinitely, then, under competitive conditions, this unemployment must lead to a 
fall in wages, going on until the excess of labor was absorbed. But these artificial 
conditions, although they may serve as a convenient model for analysis, are not a 
description of what really happens (Hicks, 1932: 56) 
Hicks’s main interest was in what really happens, and how this involves departures from pure 
theory.  For  example,  theory  states  that  wages  must  decrease  in  the  presence  of 
unemployment. It can be observed that this does not happen. Why is that so, asks Hicks. He 
suggests three reasons. First, an irrepressible level of unemployment always exists because of 
the presence of ‘unemployable’ workers whose efficiency is subnormal and who are long-
term unemployed. A second reason lies in the existence of a non-competitive labor market 
where trade unions play a central role. Third, even when the economy is in a stationary state, 
frictional unemployment is present: 
For although the industry as a whole is stationary, some firms in it will be closing 
down or contracting their sphere of operations, others will be arising or expanding 
to take their place. Some firms, then will be dismissing, others taking on, labour; 
and when they are not situated close together, so that knowledge of opportunities 
is imperfect, and transference is attended by all the difficulties of finding housing 
accommodation,  and  the  uprooting  and  transplanting  of  social  ties,  it  is  not 
surprising that an interval of time elapses between dismissal and re-engagement, 
during which the workman is unemployed (Hicks, 1932: 45). 
To Hicks, frictional unemployment is an equilibrium phenomenon. Firms have no interest in 
profiting from the existence of unemployment to cut wages. Such attempts would ultimately  
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prove futile. “By reducing wages he [the employer] has reduced his chances of getting good 
workmen; and sooner or later he will find that he suffers” (Hicks, 1932: 46).  
Hicks’s analysis calls for two observations. First, as the author of Value and Capital (1939), 
Hicks is rightly considered an important contributor to economic theory. However, drawing 
on his book on wages, published in the same decade, it is striking to note what limited faith 
Hicks had in economic theory (although he did not seek to repudiate it). His reasoning can be 
summarized in the following three steps: (a) pure theory has little room for unemployment; 
(b)  unemployment  is  nonetheless  an  undeniable  fact  of  life;  (c)  there  are  discrepancies 
between the pure theory model and reality ― explaining unemployment involves resorting to 
factors relating to the interstices between them. To all intents and purposes, this amounts to 
foregoing providing a theoretical explanation of unemployment.  
My second observation is that even the little room that Hicks grants unemployment in pure 
theory is unwarranted. Look at the following quotation summarizing his standpoint: 
Wages, say the textbooks, tend to that level where demand and supply are equal. 
If supply exceeds demand, some men will be unemployed, and in their efforts to 
regain employment they will reduce the wage they ask to that level which makes 
it  just  worthwhile  for  employers  to  take  them  on.  If  demand  exceeds  supply 
employers will be unable to obtain all the labour they require, and will therefore 
offer higher wages in order to attract labour from elsewhere (Hicks, 1932: 4). 
At  first  glance,  everybody  will  accept  this  statement.  To  me,  however,  it  is  flawed  as  it 
betrays Marshallian value theory (as analyzed above). Hicks errs because of his failure to 
separate the formation of market and normal equilibrium. As far as market equilibrium is 
concerned, false trading ought to be excluded as soon  as the constant marginal utility of 
income cannot be applied, which is the case for the labor market. The implication is that 
market  disequilibrium  has  only  a  virtual  existence,  being  eliminated  before  becoming 
effective.  Hicks  is  thus  wrong  to  take  for  granted  the  existence  of  unemployment  in 
Marshallian theory as a result of the slow adjustment of wages. Whenever present in the 
Marshallian framework, slow adjustment pertains to the formation of normal equilibrium but 
not of market equilibrium. This is the point that Hicks and the textbooks have missed. He falls 
prey to the mistake, pointed out earlier in this paper, of believing that slow adjustment can 
explain  unemployment.  We  may  suspect  that,  if  an  economist  as  sharp  as  Hicks  could 
misunderstand Marshallian theory in this way, so too would the majority of other economists 
at the time. 
To summarize the discussion on Hicks, we can conclude that, except for his slow adjustment 
argument, he viewed unemployment as a topic that could not be dealt with by pure theory. In 
a sense, he was right: I have shown that unemployment cannot be integrated into the standard  
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Marshallian  model.  However,  he  failed  to  take  the  next  step  of  understanding  that  other 
theoretical formulations (search theory) could be pursued more profitably.  
Pigou 
Pigou wrote a short introductory essay, entitled Unemployment, in 1914 and, later, a more 
elaborate book, Theory of Unemployment (1933). Keynes took it as his foil in the General 
Theory, as if his book was the perfect incarnation of classical orthodoxy. As noted by Hicks in 
his  IS-LM  paper,  Pigou’s  book  was  new  and  difficult,  and  “to  most  people,  its  doctrine 
seemed quite as strange and novel as the doctrines of Mr. Keynes himself” (Hicks, 1937: 
126).  
Like the other authors examined here, Pigou takes it as a compelling fact of life that an excess 
supply of labor is the normal state of affairs. As a result, all his analyses are conducted on the 
premise that labor demand plays the active role in the determination of employment (and 
hence of unemployment as well): “The quantity of employment is equal to the quantity of 
labour demanded” (Pigou, 1933: 9).15 That is, firms determine employment unilaterally. For 
all his having been Marshall’s favorite pupil, Pigou failed to realize that this premise departed 
from  Marshallian  orthodoxy  by  a  long  way.  The  orthodoxy  would  rather  have  it  as:  the 
quantity of employment is determined by the intersection of the supply of and demand for 
labor. Pigou is not explicit about the reasons behind the permanent excess supply of labor. 
Most commentators think that Pigou only examined fixed real wages.16  
Pigou’s book is frustrating. The reader expects to learn about unemployment and, in view of 
the  time  when  it  appeared,  about  massive  unemployment,  but  Pigou  fails  to  deliver. 
Moreover, there is a gap between the book’s title and its contents. The book comprises about 
three hundred pages. Two hundred forty of these are devoted to the study of the short-period 
elasticity of the real demand for labor, and of the factors affecting this demand, a rather 
excruciating read. The motivation for this study is to ascertain what changes in wages are 
required to make the demand for labor (and hence employment) increase. This may be a fine 
motivation, but it leads Pigou into laborious detours. It is only in Part V of the book, starting 
on p. 247, that the subject of the causation of employment and unemployment is broached. At 
this juncture it is doubtful whether readers will find the substance of what Pigou has to say to 
be  worth  all  the  preliminaries.  In  effect,  Pigou’s  views  look  trivial  and  insufficiently 
elaborated: 
With perfectly free competition among workpeople and labour perfect mobility, 
the nature of the relationship [between the real wage and demand] will be very 
                                                 
15 Pigou qualifies this statement by adding that the number of unfilled vacancies should be subtracted from the 
quantity of labor demanded. 
16 See Klausinger (1998: 54). Further references can be found in this article.  
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simple. There will always be at work a strong tendency for wage-rates to be so 
related  to  demand  that  everybody  is  employed.  Hence,  in  stable  conditions 
everybody is employed. The implication is that such unemployment as exists at 
any  time  is  due  wholly  to  the  fact  that  changes  in  demand  conditions  are 
continually  taking  place  and  that  frictional  resistances  prevent  the  appropriate 
wage adjustment from being made instantaneously (Pigou 1933: 252). 
Frictions are thus declared to be the cause of unemployment. The impression is given that 
once this cause is uncovered, nothing more remains to be done. There is no need to theorize 
frictions. While frictions are the culprit, wage policy is an aggravating factor: 
There is reason to believe that the goal at which wage policy aims is sometimes, 
in some centres of production at all events, a wage-rate substantially higher than 
the rate which, if adopted everywhere, would yield nil unemployment (Pigou, 
1933: 253). 
Like  Hicks,  Pigou’s  reasoning  evolves  at  a  high  level  of  abstraction.  His  book  has  little 
relevance to the problems that were plaguing the western economies at the time. When he 
eventually comes to utter a few remarks about the post-war period, Pigou could hardly have 
been more orthodox:  
Our  general  conclusion  then  must  be  that,  as  a  remedy  for  the  heavy 
unemployment  of  the  post-war  period,  a  mere  correction  of  wage  inequalities 
would probably have proved, not merely unavailing, but actually harmful. This 
would have been so even were labour perfectly mobile, and in actual conditions 
the argument is a fortiori. To reduce unemployment from the side of wages it 
would have been necessary, after wage inequalities had been reduced and labour 
appropriately redistributed, also to reduce the average rate of real wages (Pigou, 
1933: 270). 
It  is  true  that  Keynes’s  criticism  of  Pigou  was  often  off-target.  Nonetheless,  Keynes’s 
annoyance with Pigou’s book is understandable. Not only did it defend retrograde policy 
conclusions,  but  also,  like  Hicks’s  writings,  it  presented  a  poor  image  of  the  economic 
profession as consisting of people engaged in abstract work and unable to come to grips with 
the problems that were plaguing the times. 
Conclusion 
The pitfall of a retrospective reading of past works is that one tends to be too hard on past 
authors. Things that look obvious to us seem to have escaped their attention. This being so, I 
am  nonetheless  struck  by  the  rudimentary  character  of  pre-Keynesian  theories  of 
unemployment.  Explanatory  factors  are  brought  forward  and  commented  upon,  but  any 
attempt to demonstrate them is lacking. What is called theory only consists of expressing  
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opinions about reality, and a general discourse around and about the subject. Moreover, when 
reading books like Pigou’s and Hicks’s, it is hard to imagine that they were written in the 
midst of the Great Depression. Read in isolation, Keynes’s diatribe in Chapter Two of the 
General Theory against economists, comparing them to Candides cultivating their gardens 
while proclaiming that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, may look 
like  a  somewhat  bewildering  piece  of  rhetoric.  But  Keynes’s  outburst  becomes  more 
comprehensible  when  related  to  the  theoretical  literature  of  the  time,  which  was  indeed 
disconnected  from  what  was  happening  in  reality.17  Beyond  doubt,  there  was  something 
wrong with economic theory. The issue of unemployment had to be considered afresh.  
 
KEYNES’S GENERAL THEORY 
Reconstructing Keynes’s theoretical project 
Keynes’s General Theory (1936) is a complex book, intertwining different types of arguments 
developed at distinct levels of abstraction. Most commentators agree that Keynes’s aim in this 
book was to demonstrate the theoretical existence of involuntary unemployment. The latter, 
he recognized, had found no room in economic theory in spite of its compelling real-world 
existence. Bridging this gulf was the task he set himself. The line he took was to state that 
involuntary unemployment resulted from a deficiency in aggregate demand, which was itself 
the result of insufficient investment.  
The  broader research  program in  which  this  aim  was  embedded  can  be  called  ‘Keynes’s 
program’. I view it as consisting of the following four objectives, to be fulfilled jointly:  
(1)  demonstrating the existence of involuntary unemployment;  
(2)  demonstrating that wage rigidity is not its cause;  
(3)  giving  a  general  equilibrium  or  interdependency  explanation  of  the 
phenomenon while adopting a perfect competition framework;  
(4)  demonstrating  that  demand  stimulation  rather  than  wage  deflation  is  the 
proper remedy for the problem. 
The usual reasoning in Keynes’s time was that unemployment was the result of excessive 
wages or of wages that adjust too slowly. Another feature of traditional theory was that it was 
put forward against the background of a Marshallian analysis in which one market, in this 
case the labor market, is considered in isolation from the rest of the economy. Keynes wished 
to  escape  from  this  framework  in  two  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  he  wanted  to  exonerate 
                                                 
17 Hence my contention that the most interesting of the early works is Beveridge’s book, because it pursues the 
modest aim of providing a detailed descriptive account of the working of markets.  
 
15 
excessive wages from any responsibility for the existence of involuntary unemployment. On 
the other hand, he believed that its cause had to be looked for outside the labor market. What 
Keynes was actually striving for was to move the analysis of unemployment from a partial to 
a  general  equilibrium  framework  (although  this  terminology  did  not  exist  in  his  time). 
However, his willingness to adopt an interdependency perspective should not be interpreted as 
adhesion to the Walrasian general equilibrium approach. In Keynes’s time, Walras’s views 
were little known in Cambridge and, for better or worse, Keynes did not think that Walras’s 
theory would be of any help in his own project. Moreover, Keynes did not want to join the 
imperfect competition line of argument, which was emerging at the time in Cambridge. He 
wanted  to  formulate  his  argument  in  terms  of  perfect  competition,  possibly  because  he 
associated imperfect competition with collusion, unions, etc. His concern was to bring to the 
fore something deeper, namely the idea that unemployment was possible even when the labor 
market was functioning in a perfectly competitive way, without either frictions or market 
power.  
Different kinds of unemployment? 
In Chapter Two of the General Theory, Keynes claims that different types of unemployment 
exist, including frictional unemployment and involuntary unemployment. He also gives the 
impression that economic theory is on solid ground as far as the explanation of frictional 
unemployment is concerned.18 What is needed, according to Keynes, is the consideration of 
an additional type of unemployment, involuntary unemployment. Fulfilling this task is the 
main purpose of his book.  
Does  the  alleged  real-world  co-existence  of  frictional  unemployment  and  involuntary 
unemployment extend to theory? That is, did Keynes propose a theory in which these two 
types of unemployment co-exist? The answer is ‘No’. When it came to developing his theory, 
Keynes  only  considered  one  kind  of  unemployment,  involuntary  unemployment,  i.e. 
unemployment caused by a deficiency in effective demand. Either involuntary unemployment 
is present or there is no unemployment at all, and the Marshallian state of a match between 
supply of and demand for labor exists. Hence the adjective is unnecessary. 
Effective demand à la Keynes versus effective demand à la Marshall 
Keynes introduces the notion of effective demand in Chapter Three of the General Theory. He 
defines it as the intersection between aggregate  demand and supply, both of which are a 
function  of  the  quantity  of  goods  produced,  and  hence  of  employment.  He  claims  that 
involuntary  unemployment  is  present  whenever  the  employment  level  associated  with 
effective demand is lower than full employment. Hence his central claim is that the cause of 
                                                 
18 My survey has cast doubt on this view. Nothing worth being called a theory of frictional unemployment 
existed at the time.  
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involuntary  unemployment  lies  in  a  deficiency  of  effective  demand.  This  deficiency  is 
underpinned by what he calls the ‘fundamental psychological law’ of a decreasing marginal 
propensity  to  consume  out  of  income.  Involuntary  unemployment  results  when  this 
proportionate  decrease  in  consumption  fails  to  be  matched  by  a  sufficient  demand  for 
investment goods.  
I fully agree with Clower (1997: 42) when he claims that Keynes’s theory of effective demand 
merely  restates  in  aggregate  form  a  Marshallian  partial  equilibrium  supply  and  demand 
model. More precisely, Keynes’s aggregate supply/demand analysis is an extrapolation of 
Marshall’s analysis of firms’ optimal short-period production decision, which was discussed 
above. That is, the formation of effective demand is accounted for in the same way as the 
formation of the representative firm’s equilibrium values. It occurs first in entrepreneurs’ 
minds as the result of a thought-experiment on market outcomes. The entrepreneurs make 
conjectures about the aggregate supply price and the aggregate demand price functions, and 
derive effective demand as their intersection. As in Marshall’s model, there is no problem of 
realization. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that these conjectured values actually arise 
once the economy starts to unfold. None of this would happen if the entrepreneurs did not 
have perfect information. The heroic character of the assumption is even stronger in Keynes’s 
model than in Marshall’s, since the exercise now bears on the whole economy.  
Of course, there are some differences between Keynes’s and Marshall’s models, but these are 
minor. Keynes considered proceeds (i.e. price times quantity) as the dependent variable rather 
than price alone. He also took employment, not the quantity produced, as the independent 
variable. Finally, he reasoned as if his analysis concerned the whole of the economy, or at 
least its manufacturing sector, but this makes no difference because the economy is viewed as 
a single sector. This change is purely semantic.  
The conclusion to be drawn is that Keynes’s theory of effective demand is less original than it 
appears to readers who are unfamiliar with Marshallian theory. This raises another question: 
what explains that, unlike ‘effective demand à la Marshall’, ‘effective demand à la Keynes 
features a market non-clearing result? 
My  answer  runs  as  follows.  The  sole  element  of  Marshallian  reasoning  which  Keynes 
abandoned, is the view that the aggregate supply price function incorporates the cost of inputs 
at their market-clearing values, at least as far as labor is concerned. Instead, he assumes that 
the wage rate upon which firms elaborate their supply price function is a ‘false’ (i.e. non-
market-clearing) wage. To retain the assumption that firms are correct in their conjectures (as 
stated above, if this assumption is dropped, a theory of learning is needed), I must conclude 
that  their  incorporation  of  a  false  wage  into  their  conjecture  follows  from  their  correct 
anticipation  that  this  is  indeed  what  will  happen  in  the  labor  market.  As  to  the  factor 
explaining the prevalence of the false wage, there exists only one candidate: exogenous wage  
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rigidity. Therefore, all the claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it is difficult to escape the 
view that Keynes’s effective-demand reasoning is based on a fixed-wage hypothesis. The 
reason for unemployment lies in the labor market, and no fuss should be made about effective 
demand being the cause of unemployment. The existence of unemployment logically precedes 
the determination of effective demand rather than the other way round.  
That Keynes adopted the nominal-wage rigidity assumption in Chapter 3 is beyond dispute. 
But he stated that its introduction served only a simplifying purpose. and that it would be 
removed later in the book without harming his theory. To settle the issue, I need to assess 
Chapter 19 of the General Theory, where this removal is allegedly made. This will be done 
later. At this juncture, I will simply note that the introduction of this assumption is intriguing. 
What an oddity to have brought it into the picture! Keynes was well aware that the wage-
rigidity assumption was the main, if not the only, rival to his own preferred explanation. It is 
unusual to introduce a rival explanation as a simplifying device in one’s own argument. In 
order  to  remove  any  ambiguity,  would  it  not  have  been  safer  to  avoid  this  explanation 
altogether, albeit at the price of a more complicated demonstration?  
The time framework of Keynes’s analysis 
In the General Theory, Keynes treads in Marshall’s footsteps by deciding to analyze the short- 
and the long-period separately. I have already discussed the rationale for this strategy: the 
theory’s explanandum is too complex to be studied as a whole. But it has several drawbacks. 
Two of them are visible in the General Theory. The first is a lack of consistency. Keynes uses 
the perfect-information assumption to study the short period, but when it comes to the long 
period he goes for the radical-uncertainty assumption. The issue of how the short and long 
periods interact is left unaddressed.  
A second ambiguity pertains to the time framework adopted by Keynes when developing his 
aggregate-demand deficiency. He argues that this is a short-period analysis. From Hicks’s 
inaugural paper onwards, IS-LM models have followed suit ― “thus I assume that I am 
dealing with a short period in which the quantity of physical equipment of all kinds available 
can be taken as fixed.” (Hicks, 1937: 127). But is this so obvious? The point is to see what the 
‘short period’ means. Does it designate a single period of exchange (Hicks’s Monday or, in 
reference to Marshall’s model, the single day on which the corn market was studied) or a 
short sequence of periods of exchange? The latter is the Marshallian definition of the short 
period.  Returning  to  the  General  Theory,  if  the  issue  to  be  solved  is  the  emergence  of 
involuntary unemployment, the period of exchange (or market day) ought to be the relevant 
time framework for studying it. In effect, involuntary unemployment must necessarily occur 
on a given market day. I must insist on this point. Were we just wanting to make a descriptive 
assessment,  we  might  look  at  quarterly  statistics  and  observe,  for  example,  that  
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unemployment increased by a certain percentage over a given quarter. But such a statement 
will not do when it comes to a theoretical discourse (here understood as modelized reasoning).  
Any salvation from Chapter 19? 
If the analysis above is valid, one cannot but be skeptical about Keynes’s ability to deliver on 
his Chapter 3 promise to lift the nominal wage rigidity assumption later in the book without 
impairing  the  aggregate-demand  deficiency  claim.  This  task,  he  claims,  is  performed  in 
Chapter 19. To Patinkin, an eminent Keynes scholar, this chapter constitutes the apex of the 
General Theory, proving “that, the many contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
analysis of this book does not depend on the assumption of absolutely rigid money wages” 
Patinkin, 1987: 28).19 Keynes’s claim can be summarized as follows: it can be concluded that 
too  high  wages  are  not  the  cause  of  involuntary  unemployment  as  soon  as  it  has  been 
demonstrated that a decrease in the wage rate results in an increase in unemployment. In order 
for  employment  to  increase,  it  is  necessary  that  the  decrease  in  wages  causes  either  an 
increase in the marginal efficiency of capital or a decline in the interest rate, but neither of 
these effects is bound to occur.  
As a prerequisite of gauging Keynes’s claim, I need to clarify whether it relates to the real 
world or to a fictitious theoretical universe. As to the issue of whether decreases in nominal 
wages  succeeded  in  decreasing  mass  unemployment  during  the  Great  Depression,  most 
economists agree that they did not. For my part, I want to insist on the point that what is at 
stake is the ability to generate this result in a theoretical model. In this context, it is crucial 
that the time assumptions are precise. This is where Keynes errs.  
While  the  emergence  of  involuntary  unemployment  was  studied  in  the  market-day 
framework, Chapter 19 considers another object of study, the success (or the lack thereof) of 
the adjustment process across market days. Two separate adjustment processes need thus to 
be disentangled, the adjustment within the market day and the adjustment across market days. 
Whenever the object of analysis is effective demand, the impediment to adjustment caused by 
wage rigidity occurs within the market day. This is the type of wage rigidity that needs to be 
removed and replaced with the flexibility assumption. But then this is the very thing that 
Keynes does not do in Chapter 19. The issue that he actually tackles relates to the adjustment 
process across market days — will employment increase if wages decrease from one market 
day to the next? This question does not address the wage formation process on a given market 
day. Thus, it must be presumed that the assumption made earlier in this respect still prevails: 
                                                 
19 Many commentators have trod in Patinkin’s footsteps. To give just one example: “It is  true that Keynes 
assumed a fixed money wage for the first eighteen chapters of the book, but this, as he explained, was just ‘to 
facilitate the exposition’. In Chapter 19, entitled ‘Changes in Money Wages’ he relaxed the assumption and 
argued that it made no difference to the conclusions of the previous eighteen chapters” (Howitt, 1990: 72). See 
also Trevithick (1992).  
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the labor market is under the spell of an exogenous wage floor. That is, an exogenously rigid 
wage is assumed at each trading round, but it may be different across these rounds. Would 
employment increase if the exogenous wage floor were lower on market day t2 than on market 
day t1? This is the question addressed in Chapter 19. Now, Keynes may well have clinched a 
point by stating that this can fail to happen but this is hardly tantamount to removing the 
point-in-time rigidity assumption, the task that needed to be addressed to exonerate nominal 
rigidity  from  causing  involuntary  unemployment  during  a  given  period  of  exchange.  So, 
contrary to what Keynes, Patinkin and others have claimed, the rigid wage assumption, as 
introduced in Chapter 3 and pertaining to a given market day, is not removed in Chapter 19.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this paper was to assess the implication of trying to anchor Keynes’s theory more 
firmly  in  Marshallian  theory.  Many  other  authors  have  emphasized  the  need  for  such  an 
anchorage, but they have assumed that it would reinforce the validity of Keynes’s argument. I 
have shown that the contrary is true. This anchorage leads to the conclusion that Keynes was 
unable to achieve his program, the main stumbling block being to demonstrate simultaneously 
the existence of involuntary unemployment and the exoneration of wage rigidity as its cause. 
However, we should not blame Keynes for his failure. The task was beyond the reach of any 
economist in the 1930s, in view of the state of the discipline at the time. To have started the 
quest in the way he did was already a considerable feat. The claim made in this paper is not 
that Keynes was wrong. It is rather that he was unable to rigorously modelize his intuitions.  
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